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I.  INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 
Extensive research shows that Oregon and other western states already have 
experienced noticeable changes in climate and predicts that more change will 
occur in the future.1 Much of this change is having and will continue to have 
negative economic consequences. Some negative effects are readily recognized: 
warmer stream temperatures during summer stressing salmon and trout 
populations, prolonged drought destroying farmers’ crops, and rapidly growing 
insect populations attacking trees. In response, families, businesses, and 
communities are considering actions that would reduce the emissions of carbon 
dioxide and other greenhouse gases (GHGs) that contribute to climate change. 
Amid all this activity, many have concluded that such actions should not be 
undertaken because their costs are too great. They reach this conclusion, 
however, without first seeing what the costs would be of not taking these actions 
and allowing climate change to continue unabated.  
Until now, attempts to describe the costs of climate change have produced 
results that are too abstract to matter to most citizens. Some have estimated the 
global costs, but what does this mean to an average family in Oregon? Others 
have looked at the costs that will materialize over the next several centuries, but 
what does that mean to people making decisions today? A few have attempted to 
describe the net costs of taking this or that action, but undermined their efforts 
by focusing mostly on describing the action and not providing a full, easily 
understandable description of the consequences of not taking it. 
The first step toward filling the gap was taken a few years ago by the Climate 
Leadership Initiative at the University of Oregon, which produced the first 
climate economic report for Oregon and used information available at that time.2 
The current report builds on that assessment and additional data available today. 
It illustrates some of the potential costs Oregon’s families, businesses, and 
communities might incur over the next several decades if Oregon, other states, 
the U.S., and other countries were to extend a business-as-usual approach to 
climate change. Under this approach, we assume behaviors do not change and 
the emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases would continue to 
grow at rates similar to those seen during recent years, leading to increases in 
global temperature such as those depicted in the high-emission scenarios 
                                                      
1 See, for example, the assessments of climate science and other reports prepared by the  U.S. 
Climate Science Program: http://www.climatescience.gov/, and the reports of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change: http://www.ipcc.ch/ 
2 Resource Innovations Institute for a Sustainable Environment, University of Oregon. 2005. The 
Economic Impacts of Climate Change in Oregon: A Preliminary Assessment. October. Retrieved 
December 19, 2008, from http://climlead.uoregon.edu/publicationspress/Consensus_report.pdf. 
The Institute produced a similar assessment of the impacts of climate change for the State of 
Washington. See, Washington Economic Steering Committee and the Climate Leadership Initiative, 
Institute for a Sustainable Environment, University of Oregon. 2006. Impacts of Climate Change on 
Washington’s Economy: A Preliminary Assessment of Risks and Opportunities. November. Retrieved 
December 19, 2008, from http://www.ecy.wa.gov/climatechange/economic_impacts. 
htm 
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described by the U.S. Climate Science Program, the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC), and others.  
We take this approach with full recognition that it does not address all the 
potentially important effects of climate change on Oregon’s economy. Moderate 
warming might have some positive economic effects for some Oregonians, by 
boosting the output of some farmers, for example, or allowing some recreational 
activities to occur earlier in the spring and later in the autumn. Many of the most 
serious economic consequences of a business-as-usual approach to climate 
change will occur elsewhere, or beyond the next several decades, but still are 
important to today’s Oregonians. As Oregonians become more familiar with the 
prospect of changes in climate they likely will take actions to mitigate the harm. 
All these concerns must be considered to have a complete picture of how climate 
change will affect Oregon’s economy. This report provides only one piece of the 
picture: the potential, gross costs that might materialize in this state over the next 
several decades, if societies here and elsewhere fail to address climate change by 
proceeding in a business-as-usual manner. 
To facilitate better understanding of our findings, we place each potential cost in 
a setting familiar to today’s Oregonians, assuming that families, businesses, and 
communities will behave in the future essentially the same as they do today and 
that future prices relative to budgets will be essentially the same as today’s. That 
is, we assume that families, farms, and businesses will continue to go about their 
activities in a business-as-usual manner. Families will continue with 
consumption patterns similar to those of today, businesses will continue to 
produce products similar to their current ones, and communities will follow 
current behaviors to organize land-use, transportation, and other activities. In 
short, we provide an estimate of costs that might materialize if climate change is 
not reined in, not a forecast of how things will actually unfold. 
We anticipate that the information in this report will help families, businesses, 
and communities better understand the nature of the economic threats that 
climate change poses over the next several decades. We emphasize, however, 
that the scope of this report is limited. It illustrates only some of the potential 
costs that might materialize if Oregon, other states, the U.S., and other countries 
were to fail to address climate change by carrying on in a business-as-usual 
manner. Insufficient data currently exist, however, for us to account for all the 
potential costs. Hence, we encourage the reader to bear in mind that Oregonians 
face substantial, multi-faceted costs in addition to those we describe here, both 
during the next several decades and beyond.  
Our analysis is structured as follows: in Section II, we present a conceptual 
framework for describing the potential negative economic effects of climate 
change. In Sections III and IV, we apply the framework and calculate 17 different 
types of potential costs. We divide these costs into two broad categories: the costs 
produced by the effects of climate change, and the costs generated by some of the 
business-as-usual activities that contribute to climate change. In Section V, we 
discuss the potential implications for Oregon’s households.  
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The 18 costs we describe are already observable. Over time, they will be 
exacerbated by potential changes in temperature, precipitation and other climate 
characteristics, or by climate-related changes in the state’s ecosystems. The extent 
of the anticipated climate change is closely related to increases in the 
atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide, which was about 260 to 280 parts 
per million (ppm) before the Industrial Revolution and has risen to about 385 
ppm today. Under our business-as-usual assumptions, the concentration would 
rise to about 400 ppm by 2020, 500 ppm by 2040, and 800 ppm by 2080.3 At these 
concentrations, climate modeling indicates that average global surface 
temperature could rise by more than 5°C (9°F) above pre-industrial levels by the 
end of this century (during the past century, the temperature rose 0.74°C (1.33°F), 
mostly in the past three decades).  
Economic costs would arise from undesirable changes in climate, ecosystems, or 
both. Higher temperatures would increase the incidence of heat-related health 
problems, for example, and ecosystem changes would reduce summertime 
stream flows. These and similar changes would impose economic costs on 
Oregon’s families, businesses, and communities. In addition, Oregonians would 
incur costs as they engage in practices that contribute to climate change, such as 
consuming electricity generated by burning coal and continuing with 
technologies and practices that waste energy. For each type of cost, we describe 
the mechanism that produces it, as well as the assumptions, data, and steps we 
take to calculate it.  
Figure 1 summarizes our findings, aggregating the 17 different costs into 9 
categories. By 2020, these costs total $3.3 billion per year. The major components 
of climate-change costs are potential health-related costs of about $770 million 
per year, potential reductions in salmon populations, with a value of $630 million 
per year, and recreation costs of about $170 million. In addition, continuing with 
the activities that contribute to climate change potentially would cost Oregonians 
almost $1.3 billion per year in missed opportunities to implement energy-
efficiency programs and about $33 million per year in health costs from burning 
coal. The combined total annual costs would increase with time, almost three-
fold by 2080.  
If spread evenly, Oregon’s households, on average, could incur annual costs of 
$1,930 per year by 2020. Of this amount, $830 relate to expenditures on energy, 
$460 relate to health-related costs, and $370 to the adverse effects of climate 
change on salmon populations. These costs are not negligible. The 2020 average 
of $1,930 represents more than 4 percent of the current median household 
income in Oregon. Analogously, the potential costs in 2040 represent more than 5 
                                                      
3 These increases correspond to the A1FI scenario used by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC). The IPCC applies the label, business as usual, to another scenario, A2, but, since its 
development, it has understated the  actual, business-as-usual emissions of greenhouse gases. 
Hence, we use the A1FI scenario, which we believe more closely represents the trajectory of 
emissions in a business-as-usual world. See, IPCC. 2007. Fourth Assessment Report. Retrieved 
January 22, 2009, from http://www.ipcc.ch/. 
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percent of median household income and those in 2080 more than 7 percent of 
the income that half of the households in Oregon earn in a year. 
We recognize that families, businesses, and communities in Oregon may be able 
to offset or mitigate some of the potential costs in the near term by taking 
advantage of the potential economic benefits of climate change, such as increased 
production of some crops or reduced expenditures on heating, that might 
accompany moderate climate warming. Our aim, however, is not to describe this 
potential adjustment but to describe the potential consequences if such 
adjustments are not realized. Further investigation is required to determine the 
extent of these opportunities, but current evidence suggests they will not fully 
offset the costs likely to materialize with large increases in atmospheric 
concentrations of GHGs. 
Similarly, we recognize that there may be some overlap among our cost 
estimates and, hence, double counting when they are summed. We’re confident, 
Figure 1. Potential Economic Costs in Oregon Under a Business-as-Usual Approach to 
Climate Change, 2020, 2040, and 2080 (dollars per year) 
Potential Cost 2020 2040 2080 
Costs of Climate Change    
Increased Energy-Related Costs $119 million $328 million $815 million 
Reduced Salmon Populations $632 million $1.0 billion $1.9 billion 
Increased Flood and Storm Damage  $64 million $132 million $309 million 
Reduced Food Production $13 million $35 million $153 million 
Increased Wildland Fire Costs $206 million $423 million $941 million 
Increased Health-Related Costs  $764 million $1.3 billion $2.6 billion 
Lost Recreation Opportunities  $167 million $390 million $1.1 billion 
Subtotal for Costs of Climate Change $2.0 billion $3.6 billion $7.8 billion 
Additional Costs from Business-as-Usual (BAU) Activities that Contribute to Climate Change 
Inefficient Consumption of Energy $1.3 billion $1.5 billion $2.0 billion 
Increased Health Costs from Coal-Fired Emissions $33 million $38 million $52 million 
Subtotal for Costs from BAU Activities $1.3 billion $1.5 billion $2.0 billion 
TOTAL $3.3 billion $5.1 billion $9.8 billion 
 Average Cost per Household per Year $1,930 $2,400 $3,500 
Source: ECONorthwest. 
Notes: These numbers illustrate different types of annual costs Oregonians potentially would incur if society were to continue with 
a business-as-usual approach to climate change. There may be overlap between the values for some of the different types of 
costs. Nonetheless, adding the different types of costs probably seriously understates the total potential cost of climate change 
because the table excludes many additional types of climate-related costs that Oregonians would incur under a business-as-usual 
approach. The numbers do not indicate the net effect of climate change, as they do not represent a forecast of how the economy 
will respond to the different effects of climate change, or account for potential economic benefits that might materialize from 
moderate warming and other changes in climate.  
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however, that the potential costs that are not included in the calculations more 
than offset the double-counts, if any, and that the total potential costs of a 
business-as-usual approach to climate change are larger—perhaps far larger—
than the amounts shown in Figure 1.  
Some of these additional costs likely would materialize inside Oregon over the 
next several decades. Figure 2 summarizes some of these additional costs, for 
which we were unable to find adequate documentation to quantify in this report.  
Far greater costs might materialize elsewhere or in future centuries, the result of 
a business-as-usual approach to climate change over the next few decades. If 
temperatures rise to the maximum levels predicted under the business-as-usual 
scenario, billions of people in less-developed countries likely would endure 
increased thirst and starvation, thousands of species would face extinction, sea 
levels would rise several meters. and vast areas of the oceans could become 
Figure 2. Some Potential Economic Costs in Oregon Not Incorporated in this Report 
Potential Unquantified Cost 
Reduced productivity of nearshore marine environments 
Increased cooling costs for commercial and industrial businesses 
Increased costs for air conditioning and refrigeration in transportation 
Increased costs to cope with greater variability in weather conditions 
Increased pumping costs to replace surface water with groundwater for irrigation 
Increased regulatory costs for protecting additional threatened and endangered species 
Increased management costs for controlling invasive species 
Increased costs associated with flood and wind damage from more frequent and intense storms 
Reduced value of certain crops, such as tree fruits and nursery stock 
Increased costs associated with agricultural pests and diseases related to climate change 
Increased costs associated with fish and wildlife diseases related to climate change 
Reduced value of certain crops due to water stress 
Increased costs for families and businesses that move in response to climate change  
Reduced productivity of rangelands 
Increased health care costs related to expanded range of tropical and sub-tropical diseases  
Increased health care costs related to increased incidence of water- and food-borne diseases 
Reduced recreation opportunities due to increased wildland fires 
Reduced boating and other recreation opportunities due to decreased streamflows 
Increased costs to bring warmer streams into compliance with water-quality standards  
Increased insurance costs for storms, fires, sea-level rise and other effects of climate change 
Source: ECONorthwest. 
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essentially barren. To the extent that these distant effects matter to today’s 
Oregonians, the potential costs would be far greater than we indicate.  
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II.  CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK   
This analysis is concerned with the climate-related economic costs families, 
businesses, and communities in Oregon might incur over the next several 
decades under a business-as-usual approach to climate change. This approach 
has two major assumptions. One is that Oregon, other states, the U.S., and other 
countries will not take effective actions to rein in emissions of greenhouse gases 
(GHGs)and continue to engage in activities that drive climate change. We use the 
A1FI scenario described by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) to represent the future evolution of emissions and atmospheric 
concentrations for GHGs, as it seems to trace most closely the recent trends in 
emissions.4  
The other major assumption we make in this analysis is that Oregon’s 
households, businesses, and communities will continue to engage in behaviors 
and adopt technologies similar to those of today. This assumption has several 
strengths. It reflects the social and economic inertia that arises, for example, 
insofar as there exists a large amount of residential, commercial-industrial, and 
public capital built with little or no regard for climate change, and modifying or 
replacing it likely will take considerable time. It also facilitates both the analysis 
and the communication of our findings. Limited by time and money, we lacked 
the ability to construct a scenario of how Oregonians will behave over the next 
10, 30, and 70 years that is both more suitable and understandable than the 
scenario we used: that, absent major effort to rein in climate change, most 
families, businesses, and communities will try to continue doing tomorrow what 
they are doing today.  
These assumptions yield illustrations of costs that might materialize if business-
as-usual activities continue, but fall far short of a worst-case depiction of what 
the costs of climate change might be. Numerous recent reports of scientific 
studies, not represented in the most recent assessment of climate prospects by 
the IPCC from 2007, signal a growing probability that emissions of GHGs and 
average surface temperatures might rise faster than previously anticipated. Other 
studies signal a growing probability that, whatever the increase in emissions and 
temperatures, the effects of climate change will be more severe. Forests will die 
more rapidly, oceans will become less productive, ice sheets will melt more 
rapidly, epidemics of disease and pests will spread more quickly, and more. At 
the same time, meaningful progress on efforts to rein in the global emissions of 
GHGs has been slow, and many in the state continue to oppose proposals to 
                                                      
4 A recent analysis by the MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change confirms 
our choice of using IPCC’s A1FI scenario to represent business-as-usual conditions. Its analysis of 
uncertainties in emissions, the climate-system’s sensitivity to emissions, and the economy predicts 
a high probability of warming at levels that correspond to the likely range of the A1FI scenario. See 
Sokolov, A.P., P.H. Stone, C.E. Forest, R. Prinn, et al. 2009. Probabilistic Forecast for 21st Century 
Climate Based on Uncertainties in Emissions (without Policy) and Climate Parameters. Report No. 169. 
January. 
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reduce GHG emissions here or to prepare for climate changes that cannot be 
avoided. 
In the following paragraphs we first provide an overview of climate-related 
risks, and then describe ways in which climate change might impose economic 
harm on Oregon. We then outline the specific steps we have taken to produce the 
illustrations of specific types of potential economic harm that we present in 
Sections III and IV. 
A. Overview of Climate-Related Risks 
Rapidly accelerating emissions of carbon dioxide, methane, and other GHGs 
since the beginning of the 20th century have increased the average global 
temperature by about 0.74°C (1.33°F), and altered precipitation patterns.5 These 
changes in climate have had and will continue to have negative effects on the 
well being of current and future generations of humans.6 These effects are 
expected to worsen at an increasing rate as atmospheric concentrations of GHGs 
increase and global temperatures rise even further.7 Figure 3 illustrates, briefly 
and incompletely, the potential impacts of each incremental increase in average 
global temperature. 
Based on this evidence, many have concluded that society should aim to rein in 
emissions of GHGs so the rise in temperature does not exceed 2°C (3.6°F). There 
is considerable uncertainty underlying such conclusions, however. As we 
understand the scientific reports, this uncertainty suggests that the economic 
risks associated with the smaller increases in temperature (and, hence, with the 
lower levels of emissions of GHGs) are higher than they first appear, insofar as: 
• Once set in motion, the processes of climate change cannot easily be 
reversed, if at all. Temperatures will continue to rise in response to GHGs 
                                                      
5 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. 2007. Fourth Assessment Report. Retrieved January 
22, 2009, from http://www.ipcc.ch/ 
6 See, for example, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. 2007. Fourth Assessment Report. 
Retrieved January 22, 2009, from http://www.ipcc.ch/. Some believe climate change is important 
not only for what it does for humans, but for its effects on the environment, apart from people. 
They suggest economics should consider those values, and there are good arguments for doing so. 
There similarly are good reasons for considering spiritual and other measures of the value of 
climate change that lie outside the direct purview of economics. Here, however, we focus on the 
economic connections between climate change and people. We do so not just to keep our task from 
becoming intractable but also because this relationship underlies many, if not most, of the 
motivation for human actions to restrict emissions of greenhouse gases and to prepare for 
unavoidable changes in climate. We take a broad view, though, of the ways in which climate 
change might affect the economic dimensions of human standards of living and quality of life. 
7 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. 2007. Fourth Assessment Report. Retrieved January 
22, 2009, from http://www.ipcc.ch/; Lynas, M. 2008. Six Degrees: Our Future on a Hotter Planet. 
New York: National Geographic Society; Stern, N. 2006. The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern 
Review. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press. Retrieved October 30, 2006, 
from http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/independent_reviews/stern_review_economics_ 
climate_change/stern_review_report.cfm 
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already in the atmosphere, and additional GHG emissions will only 
reinforce the momentum. There may be no corrective actions available to 
arrest or reverse some of the processes, and their ecological and economic 
consequences, once they have been triggered. 
• Some major impacts of climate change are occurring faster than 
anticipated. Sea ice in the Arctic Ocean is melting at rates unforeseen by 
the IPCC in its 2007 integrated assessment of climate-related research 
through the early part of 2007.8 The melting of the sea ice means that solar 
energy that the ice would reflect now will be absorbed by open water, 
                                                      
8 Stroeve, J., M. Holland, W. Meir, T. et al. 2007. “Arctic Sea Ice Decline: Faster than Forecast.” 
Geophysical Research Letters 34: L09501, doi:10.1029/2007GL029703. 
Figure 3. Potential Impacts of Incremental Increases in Average Global Temperature  
1°C (1.8°F) Increased potential for prolonged drought, converting some parts of the American West to 
sandy deserts, on a scale much larger than the 1930s Dustbowl. 
2°C (3.6°F) Small mountain glaciers will disappear and mountain snowpack diminish, as will stream 
flows dependent on snow melt. Large areas of the oceans will become too acidic for 
organisms with calcium carbonate shells, and for many species of plankton, the basis of 
the marine food chain. Onset of irreversible melting of the Greenland ice sheet would 
raise sea levels by about seven meters. Heat waves similar to the most extreme in recent 
history likely would occur every year in many places. About one-third of all species around 
the globe may be driven to extinction. Increased risk of hunger for many communities, 
especially in Africa and Asia. 
3°C (5.4°F) An increase of this magnitude could be a tipping point that causes climate change to 
become uncontrollable. The middle areas of North America likely would become deserts. 
Extreme weather, such as hurricanes, may become more intense, doubling damage costs 
in the U.S. Millions, perhaps billions may face famine from extreme drought, flooding, and 
insect infestations. Perhaps 50 percent of species face extinction. 
4°C (7.2°F) The West Antarctic ice sheet may collapse and raise sea levels another five meters. Crop 
yields likely would continue to fall in many regions. Significant shortages of water may 
affect more than a billion people, as some areas may see runoff increase by one-third. 
Perhaps 50 percent of species face extinction. Conditions typical of the Sahara Desert 
probably will materialize across southern Europe.  
5°C (9.0°F) Entire regions of the Earth might see major declines in crop production and ecosystems 
unable to maintain their current form. Forest fires, droughts, flooding, and heat waves will 
increase in intensity. Increasing probability of abrupt, large-scale shifts in the climate 
system, e.g., tropical conditions, may materialize in Arctic regions. Rising sea level 
threatens major coastal cities. 
6°C (10.8°F) The Earth would experience climate conditions associated with a period, about 250 million 
years ago, that saw perhaps 95 percent of all species go extinct. 
Source: ECONorthwest, adapted from Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. 2007. Fourth Assessment Report. Retrieved 
January 22, 2009, from http://www.ipcc.ch/; Lynas, M. 2008. Six Degrees: Our Future on a Hotter Planet. New York: National 
Geographic Society; and Stern, N. 2006. The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review. Cambridge, United Kingdom: 
Cambridge University Press. Retrieved October 30, 2006, from http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/independent_reviews/ 
stern_review_economics_ climate_change/stern_review_report.cfm; and  
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further accelerating increases in temperature. Some ice structures in the 
Antarctic Peninsula also are melting faster than expected.9 The global sea 
level has been rising faster than expected, and recent analyses conclude 
during this century it will rise twice as much as IPCC predicted in 2007.10 
The processes that enable the oceans and other elements of the global 
ecosystem to remove GHGs from the atmosphere are slowing down 
faster than anticipated.11 Trees in the U.S. and Canada are dying at 
unforeseen rates, so that some forests, rather than increasing their 
removal of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere, are contributing the 
greenhouse gas to the atmosphere.12 
• Recent research suggests that, for a given concentration of GHGs in the 
atmosphere, the temperature will rise higher than previously anticipated. 
The 2007 report of the IPCC, for example, reported that, if carbon dioxide 
concentrations were to stabilize in the range of 350 to 400 ppm, warming 
likely would stabilize within the range of 2°C to 2.4°C (3.6°F to 4.3°F), but 
it warned that larger temperature increases might occur.13 Research not 
represented in the IPCC report looks more directly at the possibility that 
temperatures will increase faster than expected. The authors of one recent 
paper find that, if carbon dioxide concentrations stabilize at 450 ppm (or 
higher) there is a substantial probability that the increase in temperature 
will rise to 6°C (10.8°F).14  
• The atmospheric concentration of GHGs has been rising faster than 
expected.15 The acceleration stems from faster than expected burning of 
                                                      
9 Pritchard, H.D. and D.G. Vaughan. 2007. “Widespread Acceleration of Tidewater Glaciers on the 
Antarctic Peninsula.” Journal of Geophysical Research 112: F03S29. 
10 Rahmstorf, S., et al. 2007. “Recent Climate Observations Compared to Projections.” Science 
316(5825): 709; and Rohling, E.J., et al. 2008. “High Rates of Sea-Level Rise During the Last 
Interglacial Period.” Nature Geoscience 1: 38-42. 
11 Le Quéré, C., et al. 2007. “Saturation of the Southern Ocean CO2 Sink Due to Recent Climate 
Change.” Science 316(5832): 1735-1738. 
12 Van Mantgem, P.J., N.L. Stephenson, J.C. Byrne, et al. 2009. “Widespread Increase of Tree 
Mortality Rates in the Western United States.” Science. 323:521-524. January 23; and Kurz, W.A., 
C.C. Dymond, G. Stinson, G.J. Rampley, et al. 2009. “Mountain Pine Beetle and Forest Carbon 
Feedback to Climate Change.” Nature. 452:987-990. April 24. 
13 Solomon, S., D. Qin, M. Manning, M. Marquis, et al. (eds.). 2007. Climate Change 2007: The 
Physical Science Basis. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Working Group I. New York: 
Cambridge University Press. An average global temperature increase of 2°C to 2.4°C (3.6°F to 
4.3°F) would mean higher temperature increases over land and in some regions. Scientists 
anticipate that the increase in temperatures over land will be larger than the global average 
increase, perhaps as great as two times larger, because land absorbs more heat than the oceans. 
14 Hansen, J., et al. 2008. “Target Atmospheric CO2: Where Should Humanity Aim?” Retrieved 
January 14, 2009, from http://www.columbia.edu/~jeh1/2008/TargetCO2_ 20080407.pdf  
15 Raupach, M.R., et al. 2007. “Global and Regional Drivers of Accelerating CO2 Emissions.” 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 104(24): 10288-10293. 
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fossil fuels for electricity, transportation and other purposes, but also 
from other contributing factors, such as a slowing in oceanic absorption 
of carbon dioxide and unexpected releases of methane, a potent GHG, 
trapped in soils.16 Several authorities have warned of the potential 
consequences. The authors of one study of past changes in climate 
concluded, for example, that warmer temperatures likely would 
accelerate the emission of GHGs into the atmosphere, and “promote 
warming by an extra 15 to 78 percent on a century scale” relative to the 
projections presented by the IPCC.17  
• Leading researchers are urgently calling for faster and steeper 
curtailment of GHG emissions to prevent catastrophic damage from 
climate change. The International Energy Agency has observed that, 
given the recent, rapid increases in the burning of fossil fuels, the average 
global temperature will rise 6°C (10.8°F) unless there is a quick and 
rigorous change in policy.18 The head of Britain’s Met Office recently 
warned that, if emissions keep rising, the average temperature could 
increase by more than 5°C (9°F) by the end of the century.19 Some 
scientists conclude that, to sustain climatic and ecological conditions 
similar to those that have existed during the development of human 
civilization, society must do more than just arrest growth in the 
atmospheric concentration of GHGs, it will have to be reduce them below 
the current level, with the concentration of carbon dioxide falling to no 
more than 350 ppm within the next several decades.20 
Not all of these (and many related) impacts would occur immediately. There is 
considerable uncertainty about how long it would take for some of the impacts to 
                                                      
16 Park, G.-H., K. Lee, and P. Tishchenko. 2008. “Sudden, Considerable Reduction in Recent Uptake 
of Anthropogenic CO2 by the East/Japan Sea.” Geophysical Research Letters 35: L23611, 
DOI:10.1029/200GL036118.; Le Quéré, C., M. Raupach, P. Ciais, T. Conway, et al. 2008. “Carbon 
Budget 2007.” Global Carbon Project. Retrieved January 6, 2009, from 
http://www.globalcarbonproject.org/carbontrends/index.htm; and Canadell, J.G., C. Le Quéré, 
M.R. Raupach, C. B. Field, et al. 2007. “Contributions to Accelerating Atmospheric CO2 Growth 
from Economic Activity, Carbon Intensity, and Efficiency of Natural Sinks.” Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Science 104 (47): 18899-18870. DOI: 10.1073/pnas.0702737104. For additional 
references, see http://www.globalcarbonproject.org/carbontrends/index.htm#References. 
17 Scheffer, M., V. Brovkin, and P.M. Cox. 2006. “Positive Feedback between Global Warming and 
Atmospheric CO2 Concentration Inferred from Past Climate Change.” Geophysical Research Letters 
33, L10702, DOI: 10.1029/2005GL025044. 
18 International Energy Agency. 2008. Energy Technology Perspectives: Scenarios and Strategies to 2050, 
Executive Summary. Retrieved January 15, 2009, from http://www.iea.org/Textbase/npsum/ 
ETP2008SUM.pdf 
19 Pope, V. 2008. “Met Office Warn of ‘Catastrophic Rise’ in Temperature.” (London) Times Online. 
December 19. Retrieved January 14, 2009, from http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/ 
environment/article5371682.ece 
20 Hansen, J., et al. 2008. “Target Atmospheric CO2: Where Should Humanity Aim?” Retrieved 
January 14, 2009, from http://www.columbia.edu/~jeh1/2008/TargetCO2_ 20080407.pdf 
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materialize, but some of the most extreme impacts likely would not materialize 
for decades or centuries. This delay does not, however, mean that the far-distant 
impacts have no economic relevance today. Decisions now that affect the 
atmospheric concentration of GHGs may set in motion climate-relate processes 
that lead to irreversible consequences. Moreover, current Oregon residents may 
have strong feelings, and thus realize a marked reduction in their economic well-
being, knowing that today’s decisions might have catastrophic consequences for 
future generations. 
Having recognized the importance of these more distant and extreme effects, we 
now set them aside, and focus on the task at hand: describing the business-as-
usual potential harm of climate change for families, businesses, and communities 
in Oregon over the next several decades. In the next section we describe the 
general mechanisms through which such harm can materialize in this context. 
B. Climate Change and the Economy  
Figure 4 illustrates some of the potential changes in climate expected over the 
next two decades. The top two maps depict the average annual temperature (left) 
and heat waves (right), and the bottom two maps depict the annual average 
precipitation (left) and extreme precipitation (right) expected by about 2030, 
relative to conditions in about 1990, under a middle-of-the-road scenario 
regarding future emissions of GHGs and their impacts. These anticipated 
changes point toward some of the ways that climate change can impose harm on 
the western states. The lower left map, for example, shows that the southwestern 
region can expect reductions—marked reductions in some areas—in 
precipitation, while some of the northern parts of the region likely will see 
precipitation increase. Individually and together, these maps indicate the 
potential for some or all in the region to realize economic harm through any 
number of mechanisms: increased droughts and floods, higher air-conditioning 
costs to cope with higher temperatures, higher incidence of morbidity and 
mortality for those without access to air conditioning, more frequent wildfires, 
loss of habitat for important species—the list is perhaps without end.21 Moreover, 
under a business-as-usual scenario, the physical changes depicted in Figure 4, 
and thus the resulting economic impacts, would likely be magnified. 
To provide some structure for thinking about the different ways in which climate 
changes can produce economic harm, Figure 5 identifies different types of 
change that can generate harm and the different ways in which harm might 
materialize. In some cases, the harm can originate directly from a change in the 
climate itself, through changes in temperature, precipitations, or storms and 
other extreme events. An increase in heat waves, for example, might increase the 
                                                      
21 We understand that the results from the temperature models generally are more robust than the 
results from the precipitation models. Nonetheless, most models generally support the 
expectations indicated by the lower left map in Figure 4. 
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incidence of heat-related human illness and death,22 high temperatures plus 
reduced precipitation might reduce the productivity of crops that wither under 
                                                      
22 See, for example, Kalkstein, L.S. and J.S. Greene. 2007. An Analysis of Potential Heat-Related 
Mortality Increases in U.S. Cities under a Business-as-Usual Climate Change Scenario. Environment 
America. September 6. Retrieved January 13, 2008, from http://www.environmentamerica.org/ 
uploads/Js/tF/JstFE5oHrsQJi5ifIA931Q/Heat-Mortality_Report_.pdf 
Figure 4. Expected Changes in Annual Temperature, Heat Waves … 
 
… Annual Precipitation and Extreme Precipitation, 2030 Relative to 1990 
 
Source: Tebaldi, C., K. Hayhoe, J.M. Arblaster, and G.A. Meehl. 2006. “Going to the Extremes; An 
Intercomparison of Model-Simulated Historical and Future Changes in Extreme Events.” Climatic Change 
79(3-4): 185-211. Adapted by Lawrence Buja and Julie Arblaster. Retrieved January 21, 2009, from 
http://www.cgd.ucar.edu/ccr/climate_change_gallery_test/ 
Note: Please refer to the original source for definitions and descriptions of units displayed in each figure. 
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drought conditions,23 and higher flooding from more severe storms might 
damage property, disrupt commerce, and take lives.24 
In other cases, climate change indirectly diminishes well-being by inducing 
changes in ecosystems or social systems. Warmer temperatures have been 
associated, for example, with ecosystem changes, such as epidemic outbreaks of 
insects that kill pine trees and reduce the productivity of the timber industry,25 
rises in sea level that erode ocean-front property and increase the cost of 
maintaining coastal homes and highways,26 and contractions of fish habitat that 
diminish salmon populations and eliminate opportunities for recreational 
fishing.27 Climate-related changes in social systems that can diminish economic 
well-being might arise if families and businesses conclude they must move to 
avoid the effects of climate change, or if the costs of climate change fall 
disproportionately on poor families and communities, diminishing their 
prospects for climbing out of poverty.  
The bottom of Figure 5 illustrates that climate-related economic harm can occur 
in several ways. This summary illustrates each mechanism in greater detail: 
• Reduction in human health and other constituents of quality of life. 
Hotter temperatures can increase human mortality; reductions in 
stream flows can reduce boating, fishing, and other recreational 
opportunities. 
• Reduction in the value of assets or in the level of income. 
Increased flooding from climate-related storms can reduce the value 
of exposed properties and disrupt employment for workers at 
commercial and industrial enterprises in low-lying areas. 
                                                      
23 See, for example, Hatfield, J., et al. 2008. “Agriculture.” The Effects of Climate Change on Agriculture, 
Land Resources, Water Resources, and Biodiversity in the United States. U.S. Climate Change Science 
Program and the Subcommittee on Global Change Research. Washington D.C., USA. 
24 See, for example, Munich Re Group. 2008. Catastrophe Figures for 2008 Confirm that Climate 
Agreement is Urgently Needed. December 29. Retrieved January 16, 2009, from 
http://www.munichre.com/ en/press/press_releases/2008/2008_12_29_press_release.aspx 
25 See, for example, Carroll, A., S. Taylor, J. Regniere, and L. Safranyik. 2004. “Effects of Climate 
Change on Range Expansion by the Mountain Pine Beetle in British Columbia.” In T.L. Shore, J.E. 
Brooks, and J.E. Stone, (eds.) Mountain Pine Beetle Symposium: Challenges and Solutions. October 30-
31, 2003, Kelowna, British Columbia, Canada. Natural Resources Canada, Canadian Forest Service, 
Pacific Forestry Centre, Victoria, British Columbia, Information Report BC-X-399. Pp. 223-232. 
26 See, for example, Mote, P., A. Petersen, S. Reeder, et al. 2008. Sea Level Rise in the Coastal Waters of 
Washington State. University of Washington Climate Impacts Group and the Washington 
Department of Ecology. January. 
27 See, for example, United States Environmental Protection Agency. 1995. Ecological Impacts from 
Climate Change: An Economic Analysis of Freshwater Recreational Fishing. EPA Report No. 220-R-95-
004. April. 
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• Increase in climate-related expenditures and, hence, decrease in income 
available for other purposes. 
Households, businesses, and government are likely to increase 
spending on health-related issues in response to higher temperatures, 
leaving less money for discretionary household spending, business 
investment and profits, and government services. 
Figure 5. Changes in Climate Can Have Negative Effects on the Economy 
Over the Next Several Decades  
Changes in Climate…   
Higher Temperatures 
Increases in short- and long-run temperatures. 
Changes in Precipitation 
Decreases or increases in snow or rain, and shifts in 
seasonal precipitation patterns. 
Increases in Extreme Events 
More frequent or more severe storms, droughts, heat waves. 
Climate-Related Changes in Ecosystems  
Losses of habitat for species of concern, increases in 
undesired species (diseases and pests), reductions in 
ecosystemsʼ ability to produce desired goods and services. 
Climate-Related Changes in Social Systems 
Increases in climate-related expenditures, behaviors, and 
institutions, including migrations of population and 
economic activity away from areas facing high climate-
related risks. 
…can lead to…  Economic Harm  
Economic Costs 
Reductions in the value of goods and services  
available to society. 
Negative Economic Impacts 
Reductions in jobs, income, and related variables. 
Increases in Risk and Uncertainty 
Risk: Higher probability that harmful events will materialize in the 
future, or that harmful events will become more severe, or both. 
Uncertainty: Diminished ability to anticipate the future. 
Increases in Unprecedented Economic Conditions 
Information costs, adaptation costs, and increased economic 
impacts. 
Increases in Undesirable Distribution of Economic Well-Being 
The effects of climate change accrue in a manner people consider 
to be unfair and inappropriate.  
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• Reduction in the value of goods and services derived from the ecosystem. 
Changes in climate can diminish an ecosystem’s ability to provide 
valuable goods and services, such as those illustrated in Figure 5. The 
reduced supply of ecosystem goods and services can reduce the 
quality of life in a community and increase costs for families, 
businesses, and governments. 
• Loss of employment or reduction in employment opportunities. 
Workers may be harmed when climate-related events, such as floods 
or wildland fires, cause them to lose their jobs and incomes. The 
indirect effects of climate change also may lead to similar outcomes, 
as businesses move away from areas affected by drought to areas 
with greater availability of water.  
• Increase in risk or uncertainty about future economic conditions. 
All else equal, the economic well-being of most families, businesses, 
and communities is diminished when they experience higher risk, i.e., 
a higher probability of having bad things happen to them, and greater 
uncertainty about the probability that such events will occur. The 
prospect of climate change increases both.  
• Increase in unprecedented economic conditions. 
Preparation for and adaptation to new conditions will generate new 
costs that were not necessary to address similar concerns in the past. 
Climatic, environmental, and economic variations in the past provide 
reference for families, businesses and communities to anticipate 
impacts and adapt their activities. Insofar as climate change generates 
conditions not experienced in the past, preparation and adaptation 
will be more costly in terms of requiring new information, 
institutions, infrastructure, and behaviors.   
• Undesirable shift in the distribution of wealth, income, and other 
indicators of economic well-being. 
Many Americans may experience harm when climate change, or 
changes in ecosystems and social systems that stem from it, generate 
economic benefits for one group while imposing costs on another, 
especially if the latter is poor or otherwise disadvantaged. Similar 
harm may occur if changes in climate cause the extinction of species 
or the loss of notable landscapes and other natural resources so they 
will not be available to future generations. 
Oregonians potentially will incur additional costs not as a result of changes in 
climate but from activities that contribute to climate change. We examine two of 
these. One is the cost households and businesses would incur by continuing with 
technologies and behaviors that inefficiently use energy, even though more-
efficient alternatives are available at little or no cost. The other is the health-
related cost individuals and families would incur by being exposed to harmful 
pollutants produced by burning coal to produce electricity. 
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The analysis we present in Section III focuses on the potential economic costs of 
changes in climate, ecosystems, and social systems. We adopt this focus fully 
recognizing the importance of the other types of harm and with the hope that 
future investigations soon will be undertaken to describe them. In the following 
section, we describe our analytical approach. 
C.  Calculating the Business-As-Usual Potential 
Economic Harm 
Our objective is to illustrate the potential economic harm to families, business, 
and communities in Oregon over the next several decades under conditions 
likely to materialize if society continues to conduct its affairs without an effective 
program to rein in GHGs. We call this the business-as-usual potential economic 
harm.   
The reasoning underlying the calculation is straightforward. We begin with a 
credible, quantitative estimate of a climate-related potential worsening in some 
factor (public health, agricultural production, energy costs, etc.) that contributes 
to the economic well being of families, businesses, or communities in Oregon. 
We then multiply this times a credible estimate of the per-unit value of the factor. 
The product is an initial estimate of the potential harm per year.  
We complete the calculations by adjusting the initial estimate to represent 
business-as-usual expectations for three target years: 2020, 2040, and 2080. This 
adjustment may have three steps. First, if the literature provides estimates of the 
quantitative impact of climate change for years other than a target year (2020, 
2040, or 2080), we linearly interpolate to get a value for a target year when it falls 
between two values available from the literature, or linearly extrapolate when it 
falls outside them. For example, the maps in Figure 3 show expected changes in 
climate from 1990 to 2030. If we were to use the underlying data for our 
calculation, we would interpolate to find the expected change in 2020, and 
extrapolate to find the expected change in 2040 and 2080. The values would be 
70, 125, and 225 percent of the 1990 to 2030 change. We anticipate that linear 
interpolative and extrapolative adjustments likely understate and overstate the 
impact in the target year, respectively, as the underlying climate relationships 
apparently are nonlinear. 
Second, we adjust the initial estimate to account for business-as-usual conditions. 
This adjustment is required because most of the studies that offer a quantitative 
estimate of the impact of future climate change employ a scenario of emissions, 
temperature, and climate that assumes business-as-usual behaviors will not 
continue (i.e., society begins to act to rein in emissions). Other studies employ 
middle-of-the-road assumptions about the sensitivity of temperature and climate 
to GHG emissions, and thus potentially underestimate the possible effects of 
climate change. Accordingly, we adjust our initial estimate of the potential harm 
to reflect more closely what it would be under a business-as-usual scenario, 
based on differences among scenario assumptions of CO2 concentrations in a 
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given time period. For this exercise, we employ Scenario A1FI, as represented by 
the IPCC.28 We anticipate that using this scenario may still understate the 
potential harm under business-as-usual conditions, as actual emissions in recent 
years have exceeded the level embedded in the scenario, and recent research 
suggests the climate and ecosystem may be more sensitive than previously 
anticipated to increases in greenhouse gases. Figure 6 lists the adjustment factors 
applicable to the calculations we present in Section III. As Figure 6 shows, the 
differences between A1FI and the other emission scenarios are fairly small for 
2020 and 2040 but they increase substantially by 2080. 
Third, we adjust for anticipated changes in population. This adjustment is 
appropriate, for example, when a study estimates the future impact of higher 
temperatures on human morbidity, expressed as a change in the death rate per 
hundred-thousand population. We adjust the population of Oregon, assuming it 
will experience population growth at the rates estimated by the state through 
2040, and for the nation as a whole by the Bureau of Census after 2040.29  
The product of these steps is a representation of the potential future cost in this 
state over the next several decades if the global society should extend a business-
as-usual approach to addressing issues associated with climate change. We 
anticipate that our results will provide a useful introduction to the potential 
economic consequences of climate change, at a spatial and temporal scale that is 
useful for many Oregonians. We also anticipate that our results will provide a 
                                                      
28 IPCC, Data Distribution Centre. 2008. “Carbon Dioxide: Projected Emissions and 
Concentrations.” December 5. Retrieved January 22, 2009, from http://www.ipcc-data.org/ 
ddc_co2.html 
29 U.S. Department of Commerce, Census Bureau, Population Division. 2000. Annual Projections of 
the Total Resident Population as of July 1: Middle, Lowest, Highest, and Zero International Migration 
Series, 1999 to 2100. February 14. Retrieved January 16, 2009, from http://www.census.gov/ 
population/projections/nation/summary/np-t1.txt 
Figure 6. Adjustment Factors for Estimating the Business-As-Usual 
Impacts of Climate Change from Initial Estimates Based on 
Other Scenarios 
Adjustment to 
A1FI from… 
2020 2040 2080 
A1B 0.9929 1.0265 1.2311 
A2 1.0000 1.0286 1.1447 
B1 1.0121 1.0886 1.4879 
B2 1.0221 1.1126 1.4293 
IS92a 1.0048 1.0611 1.2825 
Source: ECONorthwest, with data from IPCC. 2008. Carbon Dioxide: Projected Emissions and 
Concentrations. Retrieved on January 16, 2009, from http://www.ipcc-data.org/ddc_co2.html 
 
 
Climate Leadership Initiative 13 ECONorthwest  
useful basis for future investigations to describe these other facets of the 
economic consequences of climate change: 
• A full assessment of all the potential near-term costs in this region, 
encompassing the many costs that are too poorly understood to describe 
today.  
• An assessment of the potential costs that might materialize outside this 
region and beyond the next several decades.  
• An estimate of the present expected value of the overall potential cost of 
climate change, reflecting the many alternative ways in which climate 
change might play out and the probability that each will occur.  
• A comparison of the potential costs and benefits associated with different 
levels of GHG emissions, actions to rein in emissions, or actions to 
prepare for and adjust to changes in climate that cannot be avoided. 
• An estimate of the costs associated with continued dependence on foreign 
oil, including payments to foreign countries.  
• A forecast of what the economy will look like in the future. Such a 
product would require information about all the potential costs and 
benefits of climate change, the climate-related actions society might take, 
and the probabilities associated with different potential outcomes. 
Some of the potential costs, called market costs, would materialize as reductions 
in cash: lower disposable incomes for households, net revenues for businesses, 
and financial resources for communities. Increased expenditures to cope with 
climate-related illness, for example, would lower household incomes, while 
reductions in workers’ productivity could also reduce business earnings and 
public tax revenues. Other potential costs, called non-market costs, would not 
have an immediate cash effect on incomes, earnings, and public finance. Much of 
the cost associated with potential reductions in salmon populations, for example, 
reflects the public’s desire to ensure that salmon will be available for future 
generations to enjoy. Both market and non-market costs are important.  
This analysis does not capture all likely costs of climate change for Oregon. 
Insufficient data are available to provide estimates for all of the potential effects 
scientists have identified, not to mention other effects not yet identified. In 
addition, Oregonians likely will experience costs that materialize beyond the 
state’s border: as climate change leads to damage from heat waves, droughts, 
and storms elsewhere in the country and the world, for example, tax dollars and 
voluntary contributions will flow out of the state to provide assistance. Today’s 
Oregonians also will incur some costs from manifestations of climate change that 
would occur beyond this century. Many Oregonians strongly want to pass to 
future generations the beaches, salmon populations, and skiing opportunities 
that exist today, for example, and will experience in economic well-being to see 
that climate change will make this unlikely, if not impossible. For all these 
reasons, we are confident that the actual potential costs of climate change in 
Oregon are larger than the amounts we have calculated.  
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III. THE POTENTIAL ECONOMIC COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH 
THE EFFECTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 
In this section we present our illustrative calculations of the business-as-usual, 
potential economic costs to families, businesses, and families in Oregon of 
climate change over the next several decades. In Section IV, we present another 
set of costs resulting from activities associated with the business-as-usual 
pathway that contribute to climate change. For each type of cost in this section 
and in Section IV, we present this information: 
Description:  We provide a short description of the potential cost, and the 
change(s) in climate, ecosystems, or social systems that likely will generate it. To 
facilitate the presentation, we organize the potential costs into these categories: 
A. Energy  E. Forest and Range Production 
B. Fish and Wildlife F. Recreation 
C. Flood and Storm Damage G. Public Health 
D. Food Production 
Assumptions, Data, and Calculation: We describe our assumptions, 
identify the information we use to quantify the business-as-usual potential cost 
and estimate its economic value, and demonstrate how we make the calculation. 
Results:  We report each business-as-usual, potential annual cost in 2020, 2040, 
and 2080. Our findings represent the costs, expressed in today’s dollars, that 
Oregonians potentially would bear if Oregonians, in concert with others around 
the world do not take meaningful action and climate change occurs as 
represented by the A1FI scenario from the IPCC.  
We anticipate that our results generally understate the potential economic costs 
climate change would impose on Oregonians if they and the residents of other 
states and nations continue in a business-as-usual manner. The degree of 
understatement increases the further one looks into the future. As atmospheric 
concentrations of GHGs increase, it becomes increasingly likely that higher 
temperatures will trigger processes that bring about even faster change in climate 
and initiate irreversible changes in ecosystems and social systems. 
We recognize that families, businesses, and communities in Oregon may be able 
to offset or mitigate some of the potential costs in the near term by taking 
advantage of the potential economic benefits of climate change, such as increased 
production of some crops or reduced expenditures on heating, that might 
accompany moderate climate warming. Our aim, however, is not to describe this 
potential adjustment but to describe the potential consequences if such 
adjustments are not realized. Further investigation is required to determine the 
extent of these opportunities, but current evidence suggests they will not fully 
offset the costs likely to materialize with large increases in atmospheric 
concentrations of GHGs. Similarly, adaptation opportunities may not offset the 
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costs of small increases, or even the costs of increases that already have occurred. 
In sum, our results do not represent a forecast of what will happen, but a 
description of what might happen. We do not present a forecast because doing so 
would inject into the calculations many variables about which little is known, at 
odds with our objective to provide results that are defensible, comprehensible, 
and useful. 
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A. Energy 
1. Reduced Hydropower Generation 
Description 
Climate models indicate that changes in the Pacific Northwest’s climate likely 
will cause runoff to increase in winter and decrease in summer, reducing value 
of hydropower produced by the region’s hydroelectric facilities. This reduction 
in value would ensue due to a mismatch between energy demand, which will 
increase in summer, and hydropower supplies, which would be lower at the 
same time. 
Assumptions, Data, and Calculation 
We apply the findings of a recent regional assessment, which concludes that 
climate-related changes in streamflow could reduce the annual average 
production of the hydropower system in the Pacific Northwest by 664 megawatts 
(MW) in 2020, and 2,033 MW in 2040. We assume the trend will continue and 
extrapolate to estimate the potential effect in 2080. We estimate Oregon’s share of 
the potential reduction in productive capacity to be 175 MW by 2020, 550 MW by 
2040, and 1,300 MW by 2080, assuming that its current share of production will 
persist. We estimate the value of the reduction in the production of energy 
assuming the forgone generation otherwise would have produced electrical 
energy year-round and applying $48.25 per MW-hour as the estimated bulk 
electricity price.a 
Results  
 
References and Notes 
a Northwest Power and Conservation Council. 2005. The Fifth Northwest Electric Power and 
Conservation Plan; Appendix N. Retrieved on December 12, 2008, from 
http://www.nwcouncil.org/energy/powerplan/5/Default.htm 
Potential Value of Reduction in Hydropower Generation 
2020 2040 2080 
$74 million $233 million $552 million 
Source: ECONorthwest 
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2. Increased Energy Consumption for Residential Indoor 
Air Cooling 
Description 
Higher temperatures during summer months will induce residential consumers 
to spend more money on air conditioning, decreasing the amount they can spend 
on other things.  
Assumptions, Data, and Calculation 
A regional assessment concludes that average July-August temperatures will 
increase 2.9°C (5.2°F) by 2040, and the associated increases in air conditioning 
will increase average regional residential demand for energy from the power 
system by about 200 megawatts (MW).a We linearly interpolate to estimate the 
increase in 2020 and extrapolate to estimate the increase in 2080. Assuming that 
Oregon’s 2000 share of regional consumption in 2000 will extend into the future, 
the additional average demand will be about 23 MW by 2020, 54 MW by 2040, 
and 140 MW by 2080. We use the average monthly residential prices in Oregon 
between 1990 and 2008 for July and August to estimate consumers’ additional 
cooling costs.b 
Results  
This calculation does not include additional expenditures for commercial or 
industrial consumers, which we expect to be small relative to the potential 
increase in Oregonians’ home electricity bills. 
References and Notes 
a Northwest Power and Conservation Council. 2005. The Fifth Northwest Electric Power and 
Conservation Plan; Appendix N. Retrieved on December 12, 2008, from 
http://www.nwcouncil.org/energy/powerplan/5/Default.htm 
b Energy Information Administration. 2008. Current and Historical Monthly Retail Sales, Revenue and 
Average per Kilowatthour by State and by Sector (Form EIA-826). Retrieved January 15, 2009, from 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/page/sales_ revenue.xls. 
Potential Value of Increased Energy Costs for Air Conditioning 
2020 2040 2080 
$16 million $37 million $92 million 
Source: ECONorthwest 
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3. Increased Energy Loss During Transmission 
Description 
Higher temperatures during climate-related heat waves will increase the amount 
of energy lost during electricity-transmission lines. During heat waves, the 
resistance of overloaded transmission lines increases, causing the grid to convert 
more electricity into heat, which wastes energy.a 
Assumptions, Data, and Calculation 
We assume summertime consumption of electricity in 2008 will increase in 
accord with the rate projected by the Energy Information Administration for 
Oregon.b We apply a middle-of-the-road estimate of the potential growth in heat-
wave days from 1990 to 2030;c linearly interpolate and extrapolate to estimate the 
number of additional days in 2020, 2040, and 2080; and adjust the numbers to 
estimate what the impact would be under a business-as-usual approach to 
climate change. If the additional transmission-line losses during a heat-wave day 
equal one-third of the electricity being transmitted,a the annual losses would total 
410,000 MW-hours by 2020, 820,000 MW-hours by 2040, and 2.4 million MW-
hours by 2080. We assume the average summertime wholesale price of 
electricity, $71 per MW-hour in 2008 dollars, will apply in the future.d 
Results  
References and Notes 
a Ackerman, F. and E.A. Stanton. 2008. The Cost of Climate Change: What We’ll Pay If Global Warming 
Continues Unchecked. Natural Resources Defense Council. May. Retrieved January 20, 2009, from 
http://www.nrdc.org/globalwarming/cost/cost.pdf 
b Energy Information Administration. 2008. EERE State Activities and Partnerships: Electric Power and 
Renewable Energy in Oregon. Retrieved January 23, 2009, from http://apps1.eere.energy.gov/states/ 
electricity.cfm/state=OR 
c Tebaldi, C., K. Hayhoe, J.M. Arblaster, and G.A. Meehl. 2006. “Going to the Extremes; An 
Intercomparison of Model-Simulated Historical and Future Changes in Extreme Events.” Climatic 
Change 79(3-4): 185-211. Adapted by Lawrence Buja and Julie Arblaster. Retrieved January 21, 2009, 
from http://www.cgd.ucar.edu/ccr/climate_change_ gallery_test/ 
d Energy Information Administration. 2008. Current and Historical Monthly Retail Sales, Revenue and 
Average per Kilowatthour by State and by Sector (Form EIA-826). Retrieved January 15, 2009, from 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/page/sales_ revenue.xls 
Potential Value of Energy Lost in Transmission During Heat Waves 
2020 2040 2080 
$29 million $58 million $171 million 
Source: ECONorthwest 
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4. Other Potential Costs of Climate Change Related to 
Energy 
Description 
Climate change undoubtedly will affect other parts of Oregon’s energy system 
but there is little research to substantiate the magnitude of these impacts. For 
instance, a recent report showed that industry may increase its energy 
consumption on days with high temperatures, people may consume higher 
amounts of gasoline due to increased use of air conditioning in their cars, and 
trucks that transport perishables may increase their fuel use to refrigerate their 
cargoes. Equally uncertain is how much farmers’ energy demand will increase on 
hot days when they ramp up irrigation to maintain soil moisture.a Other 
potential costs include damages to electricity-transmission equipment during 
floods and storms, which are expected to become more frequent and intense 
because of climate changeb and costs associated with an increased probability of 
blackouts. A study by researchers at Los Alamos National Laboratory found that 
an increase in air temperature of 1.5°C (2.7°F) would increase the probability of a 
blackout occurring from 1 time per year to 8-10 times per year. The researchers 
estimated economic loss associated with this increased probability at 1 percent of 
gross state product.c 
References and Notes 
a Scott, M.J. and Y.J. Huang. 2007. “Effects of Climate Change in Energy Use in the United States.” 
In Wilbanks, T.J., V. Bhatt, D.E. Bilello (eds.). Effects of Climate Change on Energy Production and Use 
in the United States. A Report by the U.S. Climate Change Science Program and the subcommittee 
on Global Change Research. 
b Bull, S.R., D.E. Bilello, J. Eckmann, et al. 2007. “Effects of Climate Change on Energy Production 
and Distribution in the United States.” In Wilbanks, T.J., V. Bhatt, D.E. Bilello (eds.). Effects of 
Climate Change on Energy Production and Use in the United States. A Report by the U.S. Climate 
Change Science Program and the subcommittee on Global Change Research. 
c Personal communication with Gary Geernaert, Director, Institute of Geophysics and Planetary 
Physics, Los Alamos National Laboratory. February 6, 2009. 
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B. Fish and Wildlife 
1. Reduced Salmon Habitat and Populations 
Description 
Warmer stream temperatures resulting from increased global temperatures 
reduce the amount of habitat that can viably support salmon, reducing salmon 
populations.  
Assumptions, Data, and Calculation 
We assume salmon populations will decline proportionate to expected losses of 
aquatic habitat. An assessment of stream temperatures under an A2 emissions 
scenario indicates increased warming might reduce salmon habitat in Oregon by 
13, 23, and 44 percent by 2030, 2060, and 2090, respectively.a We interpolate and 
adjust the percentages to reflect the potential changes in 2020, 2040, and 2080, as 
well as the A1FI scenario. To determine the value of the loss of salmon, we rely 
on a study of Washingtonian’s willingness to pay for changes in the size of 
anadromous fish runs.b The methodology in this study was vetted and adopted 
by a panel of economists for Washington State’s Columbia River Initiative, who 
recommended that “any reliable estimates of impacts on salmon and steelhead 
should be assigned values based upon the methodology.”c We assume that the 
value Washingtonians are willing to pay to protect salmon in Washington 
provides a reasonable indication of the value Oregonians are willing to pay to 
protect salmon in Oregon. Using results from Layton et al., we derive the value 
Oregonian’s place on the potential loss of salmon populations in Oregon in 2020, 
2040, and 2080, adjusting for growth in households over time. 
Results  
These results are based on an analysis of the value of increasing salmon stocks, 
which diminishes as fish populations become more robust. Climate change 
impacts reduce stocks, which should lead to an increasing, rather than 
decreasing value as salmon become more rare. Consequently, these estimates 
likely understate the value of salmon losses. The results also probably understate 
the total impact of climate change on salmon populations, because they overlook 
stresses from potential changes in ocean conditions, climate-related increases in 
disease, and reduced effectiveness of habitat restoration efforts, among other 
effects.d They also may not fully account for ecosystem goods and services other 
than salmon that would be lost as changes in climate affect salmon habitat. 
Potential Value of Reduced Salmon Populations 
2020 2040 2080 
$632 million $1.04 billion $1.87 billion 
Source: ECONorthwest 
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References and Notes 
a O’Neal, K. 2002. Effects of Global Warming on Trout and Salmon in U.S. Streams. Defenders of 
Wildlife and Natural Resources Defense Council. May. 
b Layton, D.F., G.M. Brown, and M.L. Plummer. 1999. Valuing Multiple Programs to Improve Fish 
Populations. April. Retrieved January 24, 2009, from http://www.econ.washington.edu/user/ 
gbrown/valmultiprog.pdf 
c Huppert, D., G. Green, W. Beyers et al. 2004. Economics of Columbia River Initiative. Washington 
Department of Ecology and CRI Economics Advisory Committee. January 12. 
d See, for example, Battin, J., M.W. Wiley, M.H. Ruckelshaus et al. 2007. “Projected Impacts of 
Climate Change on Salmon Habitat Restoration.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 104 
(16): 6720-6725. Retrieved January 23, 2009, from http://www.pnas.org/content/104/16/ 
6720.full.pdf+html; Independent Scientific Advisory Board. 2007. Climate Change Impacts on 
Columbia River Basin Fish and Wildlife. ISAB Climate Change Report ISAB 2007-2. Northwest Power 
and Conservation Council. May 11; and Richter, A. and S.A. Kolmes. 2005. “Maximum 
Temperature Limits for Chinook, Coho, and Chum Salmon, and Steelhead Trout in the Pacific 
Northwest.” Reviews in Fisheries Science 13: 23-49. 
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2. Other Potential Costs Related to Impacts of Climate 
Change on Fish and Wildlife 
Description 
Increased temperatures and changes in precipitation are likely to impact many 
species, other than salmon in Oregon. Scientists have found evidence that climate 
change can result in changes in species’ range, abundance, phenology (timing of 
an event, such as migration), morphology and physiology, and community 
composition, biotic interactions and behavior.a Many of these impacts on 
populations and ecosystems would potentially result in economic harm. For 
example, sea level rise, changes in ocean currents, and increases in ocean acidity 
are likely to impact the species and ecological communities in Oregon’s coastal 
and near-shore environments, including coastal wetlands and rocky intertidal 
areas. Disruptions in these ecosystems could adversely affect Oregon’s 
commercial and recreation fishing industries.b Temperature increases also are 
likely to disrupt montane ecosystems, particularly those associated with glaciers 
and snowpack. Some invasive species and pests, which have historically been 
limited by temperature or moisture, may be able to expand their range and pose 
new threats to native populations of fish and wildlife.c Data are not available, 
however, to allow us to estimate the costs associated with these and other 
potential fish and wildlife-related impacts. 
References and Notes 
a Root, T.L. and S.H. Schneider. 2002. “Climate Change: Overview and Implications for Wildlife.” 
In S.H. Schneider and T.L. Root (eds.). Wildlife Responses to Climate Change: North American Case 
Studies. Island Press: Washington D.C. 
b Stanford, E. 2002. “Community Responses to Climate Change: Links Between Temperature and 
Keystone Predation in a Rocky Intertidal System.” In S.H. Schneider and T.L. Root (eds.). Wildlife 
Responses to Climate Change: North American Case Studies. Island Press: Washington D.C. 
c Janetos, A.C. 2008. “Chapter 5: Biodiversity.” In Backlund, P., A. Janetos, and D. Schimel. 2008. 
The Effects of Climate Change on Agriculture, Land Resources, Water Resources, and Biodiversity in the 
United States. Synthesis and Assessment Product 4.3. U.S. Climate Change Science Program and the 
Subcommittee on Global Change Research. May. 
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C. Flood and Storm Damage 
1. Costs Related to Sea-Level Rise 
Description 
Rising global temperature leads to increased sea levels, which will inundate 
value property and structures. 
Assumptions, Data, and Calculation 
No direct estimates of the value of coastal property damage due to sea-level rise 
exist for Oregon, so we apply estimates for California.a,b After adjusting for 
differences in general coastline length, median home value, and coastal 
population density, the potential damage for Oregon in 2070 would be $56 
million per year, under the A2 scenario for future emissions and climate change.c 
Hence, we linearly interpolate and extrapolate to obtain estimates for 2020, 2040, 
and 2080, and adjust to represent the A1FI scenario.  
Results 
These results embody considerable uncertainty, as there exists no direct 
measurement of the potential damage from climate-related increases in sea level 
and storm surges. The estimate does not account for the interactive effects of 
higher sea levels and increased storm surges that would further increase 
damages. Sea-level rise and increased storm surges would generate increased 
risk of flood and storm damage for inland areas reached by the tides such as 
downtown Portland and other urban areas.  
References and Notes 
a Neumann, J., D. Hudgens, J. Herr, and J. Kassakian. 2003. “Market Impacts of Sea Level Rise on 
California Coasts.” 2003. Appendix XIII in Wilson, T. L. Williams, J. Smith, and R. Mendelsohn, 
Global Climate Change and California: Potential Implications for Ecosystems, Health, and the Economy. 
Consultant report 500-03-058CF to the Public Interest Energy Research Program, California Energy 
Commission. 
b Kahrl, R. and D. Roland-Holst. 2008. California Climate Risk and Response. Research Paper No. 
08102801. University of California. November. Retrieved January 23, 2009, from 
http://are.berkeley.edu/~dwrh/CERES_Web/Docs/California%20Climate%20Risk%20and%20R
esponse.pdf.  
c Oregon’s general coastline is 35 percent as long as California’s, its 2000 median home value was 
72 percent, and its 2008 coastal population density is 22 percent National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration. 2004. Population Trends Along the Coastal United States: 1980-2008. 
http://oceanservice.noaa.gov/programs/mb/supp_cstl_population.html. 
Potential Value of Property Damage from Sea Level Rise 
2020 2040 2080 
$16 million $33 million $73 million 
Source: ECONorthwest 
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2. Costs Related to Extreme Weather Events  
Description 
Climate change is expected to increase storm severity and the frequency of 
extreme storm events, including high winds, flooding, lightning and fire. Storm 
events will have direct property-damage effects, as well as increased storm-
related injuries and fatalities.a 
Assumptions, Data, and Calculation 
The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s National Weather 
Service and National Climatic Data Center collect information on fatalities, 
injuries, property damage, and crop damage resulting from extreme weather 
events, including weather-influenced wildfires.b The U.S. Climate Change 
Science Program provides rough estimates for increases in extreme weather 
events, including an increase in frequency of extreme precipitation events by 2.5 
times under A1B by 2100. Wildfire forecasts for the west follow similar increases 
rates with two to five times the acreage burnt at the end of the 20th century by 
late in the 21st century.c Using the average total property and crop damage 
estimates from 1996 to 2007, we linearly interpolate an increase in these impacts 
2.5 times by 2100 for 2020, 2040 and 2080, and adjust for the A1FI scenario. We do 
not monetize fatalities and injuries, but the increase by 2080 would be 12 
fatalities and 38 injuries due to extreme weather events. These include heat-
related effects that are further described and valued in the Public Health section 
below. 
Results 
References and Notes 
a U.S. Climate Change Science Program. 2008. Weather and Climate Extremes in a Changing 
Climate: Regions of Focus: North America, Hawaii, Caribbean, and U.S. Pacific Islands. In Karl, 
T.R., G.A. Meehl, C.D. Miller, S.J. Hassol, A.M. Waple and W.L. Murray (eds.). Weather and Climate 
Extremes in a Changing Climate. Synthesis and Assessment Product 3.3. Washington, DC. 
b Consistent damage cost estimates are available from 1996-2007. National Weather Service and 
National Climatic Data Center. 1996-2008. “Summary of Hazardous Weather Fatalities, Injuries and 
Damage Costs by State.” Natural Hazard Statistics. Accessed February 3, 2009 from 
http://www.weather.gov/os/hazstats.shtml#.  Adjusted to 2008 dollars. 
c Mckenzie, D., Z. Gedalof, D. Peterson, and P. Mote. 2004. “Climatic Change, Wildfire, and 
Conservation.” Conservation Biology 18: 890-902. 
Potential Value of Property and Crop Damage from Extreme Weather 
Events 
2020 2040 2080 
$48 million $99 million $236 million 
Source: ECONorthwest 
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3.  Other Potential Costs from Climate-Related Sea-Level 
Rise and Extreme Weather 
Description 
The combined impact of multiple storm and ocean effects from climate change is 
likely to be greater than the sum of the individual impacts, as interactions 
increase severity. Similarly, damages from storm events tend to increase relative 
to storm severity more than linearly.a Thresholds exist in current infrastructure 
designed to protect property and people from storm impacts.  
Sea-level rise and extreme weather events will impact natural structures and 
functions and the resulting ecosystem services communities rely upon. Storm 
events increase erosion, create landslides, damage forests and habitat, and injure 
wildlife.  
References and Notes 
a U.S. Climate Change Science Program. 2008. Weather and Climate Extremes in a Changing 
Climate: Regions of Focus: North America, Hawaii, Caribbean, and U.S. Pacific Islands. In Karl, 
T.R., G.A. Meehl, C.D. Miller, S.J. Hassol, A.M. Waple and W.L. Murray (eds.). Weather and Climate 
Extremes in a Changing Climate. Synthesis and Assessment Product 3.3. Washington, DC. 
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D. Food Production 
1. Reduced Beef Production 
Description 
Higher temperatures slow the rate of growth for beef cattle and reduce the 
production and sales of ranches and feedlots.  
Assumptions, Data, and Calculation 
We assume ranchers and feedlot operators will continue the practices of 2007 and 
that prices will remain at 2007 levels, which produced sales of $444 million.a We 
also assume that the temperature increases accompanying a doubling of carbon 
dioxide emissions would increase the time required for a cow to reach finished 
weight in a feedlot in the western United States by 2.5 percent; a tripling might 
increase the time by 15 percent.b The potential harm equals the value of annual 
beef production times the percentage loss of production from climate change, 
adjusted to reflect potential doubling of carbon dioxide emissions by 2040 and 
tripling by 2080, under scenario A1FI. 
Results  
Potential losses would be greater if ranchers tried to expand their production, so 
that higher temperatures would affect the maturation of a larger number of 
animals. Also, additional beef production losses, especially for range-fed cattle, 
may occur as range productivity declines with increasing temperatures and 
reduced water availability during summer months.c 
References and Notes 
a United States Department of Agriculture, National Agricultural Statistics Service. 2008. Meat 
Animals Production, Disposition, and Income: 2007 Summary. April. 
b Frank, K.L. 2001. Potential Effects of Climate Change on Warm Season Voluntary Feed Intake and 
Associated Production of Confined Livestock in the United States. Masters of Science Thesis. Kansas 
State University, Manhattan. As cited in Backlund, P., A. Janetos, and D. Schimel. 2008. The Effects 
of Climate Change on Agriculture, Land Resources, Water Resources, and Biodiversity in the United States. 
Synthesis and Assessment Product 4.3. U.S. Climate Change Science Program and the 
Subcommittee on Global Change Research. May. 
c Backlund, P., A. Janetos, and D. Schimel. 2008. The Effects of Climate Change on Agriculture, Land 
Resources, Water Resources, and Biodiversity in the United States. Synthesis and Assessment Product 
4.3. U.S. Climate Change Science Program and the Subcommittee on Global Change Research. May. 
Potential Value of Reduced Beef Production 
2020 2040 2080 
$7 million $11 million $67 million 
Source: ECONorthwest 
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2. Reduced Wheat Production 
Description 
Temperatures above 5°C (9°F) reduce the yields of winter wheat production. 
Assumptions, Data, and Calculation 
We assume farmers will continue with the practices that produced the 2007 crop 
and that prices will remain at 2007 levels, which produced a crop worth about 
$311 million.a We apply the results of a study that indicates wheat production in 
eastern Oregon will decline by approximately 20 percent with a 5°C (9°F) 
increase in global mean temperature, and an atmospheric carbon-dioxide 
concentration of 365 ppm.b We extrapolate and adjust this finding to estimate the 
potential reduction in production under the A1FI scenario in 2080, the only one 
of our target years that would experience a temperature increase of at least 5°C 
(9°F). The potential harm equals the value of the potential reduction in wheat 
production.  
Results 
We do not include costs for 2020 and 2040, because reduced wheat production 
does not occur until temperatures reach approximately 5°C (9°F). This 
magnitude of temperature increase is not expected to occur in the A1FI scenario 
until the later part of the 21st century. 
References and Notes 
a U.S. Department of Agriculture, National Agricultural Statistics Service. 2008. U.S. & All States 
Data – Winter Wheat [2007, Value of Production, All Winter Wheat, Oregon]. 
b Brown, R.A. and N.J. Rosenberg. 1999. “Climate Change Impacts on the Potential Productivity of 
Corn and Winter Wheat in their Primary United States Growing Regions.” Climatic Change 41: 73-
107. Although the authors hold carbon dioxide concentrations constant to control for any so-called 
fertilization effect, in which higher concentrations of CO2 accelerate plant growth, they conclude 
that even at concentrations of carbon dioxide at 750 ppm, a 5°C (9°F) increase in temperature 
causes wheat yields to decline.  
Potential Value of Reduced Wheat Production 
2020 2040 2080 
-- -- $62 million 
Source: ECONorthwest 
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3. Reduced Production of Certain Wine Grapes 
Description 
Temperature increases are expected to reduce the production of certain high-
value wine grape varietals. 
Assumptions, Data, and Calculation 
We assume vintners will continue with production at 2004 levels, and prices will 
remain at 2004 levels.a We apply the results of a study that indicates that if 
average growing season temperatures increase by 2°C (3.6°F), production of 
Pinot Noir and Pinot Gris may cease in Oregon as average growing season 
temperature increases above the optimal for these grapes.b This occurs by 
approximately 2040 under the A1FI scenario, and a 0.5°C (0.9°F) increase is 
expected by 2020. The potential harm in 2040 equals the total value of the wine 
grape production in 2004, the last year for which data are available. The potential 
harm in 2020 is about one-quarter of this amount. 
Results 
References and Notes 
a Full Glass Research. 2006. The Economic Impact of the Wine and Wine Grape Industries on the Oregon 
Economy. January. 
b Jones, G. 2006. “Climate Change and Wine: Observations, Impacts, and Future Implications.” 
Wine Industry Journal 21(4): 21-26.; and Jones, G.V. 2005. “Climate Change in the Western United 
States Grape Growing Regions.” ISHS Acta Horticulturae 689: VII International Symposium on 
Grapevine Physiology and Biotechnology. Retrieved February 2, 2009, from http://www.actahort.org/ 
books/689/689_2.htm 
Potential Value of Lost Production of Certain Wine Varietals 
2020 2040 2080 
$6 million $24 million $24 million 
Source: ECONorthwest 
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4.  Other Potential Costs from the Effects of Climate 
Change on Food Production 
Description 
Changes in precipitation and temperature are likely to impact Oregon’s 
agricultural industry in ways other than those reported above. For example, 
higher temperatures may reduce the yield or cease production altogether in some 
regions of some additional crops, such as tree fruits and nursery stock. Changes 
in temperature may also increase the occurrence of pests and plant diseases, 
requiring famers to expend more resources on pest and disease management.a 
Increased evaptranspiration and reduced availability water supplies may lead to 
reductions in yield for a variety of crops due to water stress. Insufficient data are 
available, however, to allow us to estimate the costs associated with these and 
other potential food-production-related impacts. 
References and Notes 
a Hatfield, J.L. 2008. “Chapter 2: Agriculture.” In Backlund, P., A. Janetos, and D. Schimel. 2008. The 
Effects of Climate Change on Agriculture, Land Resources, Water Resources, and Biodiversity in the United 
States. Synthesis and Assessment Product 4.3. U.S. Climate Change Science Program and the 
Subcommittee on Global Change Research. May. 
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E. Forest and Range Production 
1. Lost Forest Assets from Wildland Fires 
Description 
Wildland fires become more frequent and severe as climate change increases 
temperatures and aridity, and accelerates tree mortality from insects and disease. 
When forests burn, they lose their ability to produce many goods and services, 
but data are available only to estimate the loss assuming the forest would be 
managed to produce timber. 
Assumptions, Data, and Calculation 
Projections for climate-related changes in temperature and precipitation suggest 
that, relative to the 20th century, wildfires in Oregon will burn 50 percent more 
acreage per year by 2020 and double the acreage by 2040.a On average, 137,000 
acres of state and federal land burned annually from 1988 to 1999.b We assume 
that, if private lands burned at the same rate, the average would have been 
217,000 acres. State and federal land make up 63 percent of all forestland in 
Oregon.c A 50 percent increase in acreage burned by 2020 would be a marginal 
increase of 109,000 acres, and a 100 percent increase by 2040 would be a marginal 
increase of 217,000 acres. We assume the value of lost goods and services when a 
forest burns is at least $1,000 per acre, a general estimate for the value of lost 
timber.d We use the projected increase in burn rates for the A2 scenario, which 
we linearly extrapolate for A1FI and 2080. 
Results 
These results do not include the value of ecosystem services distinct from the 
production of timber that would be lost with increased forest fires. The loss of 
structures to fire is included under extreme weather events because the data are 
collected by the National Weather Service and aggregated with other weather-
related structural losses. 
References and Notes 
a Mckenzie, D. Z. Gedalof, D. Peterson, and P. Mote. 2004. “Climatic Change, Wildfire, and 
Conservation.” Conservation Biology 18: 890-902. 
b Climate Leadership Initiative. 2007. Economic Impacts of Climate Change on Forest Resources in 
Oregon. University of Oregon. May. This estimate is consistent with estimates by the U.S. Forest 
Service. See Fried, J. and G. Christensen. 2008. "Fire Incidence." In J. Donnegan, S. Campbell, and D. 
Azuma (eds.). Oregon's Forest Resources, 2001-2005. Five-Year Forest Inventory and Analysis Report. 
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Forest Service. General Technical Report No. PNW-GTR-765. 
November. Pp. 76-77. 
c National Association of State Foresters. 2006 State Forestry Statistics. 
http://www.stateforesters.org/files/2006%20State%20Forestry%20Statistics-Web-Final.pdf 
Potential Value of Lost Forest Assets from Increased Forest Fires 
2020 2040 2080 
$109 million $223 million $497 million 
Source: ECONorthwest 
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d Titus, J.G. 1992. “The Costs of Climate Change to the United States.” in: Majumdar, S.K., L.S. 
Kalkstein, B. Yarnal, E.W. Miller, and L.M. Rosenfeld (eds). Global Climate Change: Implications, 
Challenges, and Mitigation Measures. Pennsylvania Academy of Sciences. 
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2. Increased Control Expenditures Related to Wildland Fire 
Description 
Wildfires become more frequent and severe as climate change increases 
temperatures and aridity, and accelerates tree mortality from insects and disease. 
As wildland fires become more widespread Oregonians will incur additional 
fire-control costs. 
Assumptions, Data, and Calculation 
Projections for forests in Oregon based on temperature and precipitation suggest 
that wildland fires will impact 50 percent more acreage than during the 20th 
century by 2020 and a doubling by 2040.a We assume suppression costs will 
increase proportional to acres burned, fire suppression costs will increase as well, 
or alternatively.b We base our calculation on these rates and historical 
expenditures.c 
Results 
References and Notes 
a Mckenzie, D. Z. Gedalof, D. Peterson, and P. Mote. 2004. “Climatic Change, Wildfire, and 
Conservation.” Conservation Biology 18: 890-902. 
b National Association of State Foresters. 2006 State Forestry Statistics. 
http://www.stateforesters.org/files/2006%20State%20Forestry%20Statistics-Web-Final.pdf 
c Climate Leadership Initiative. 2007. Economic Impacts of Climate Change on Forest Resources in 
Oregon. University of Oregon. May. 
Potential Value of Increased Control Expenditures for Wildland Fires 
2020 2040 2080 
$97 million $200 million $444 million 
Source: ECONorthwest 
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3.  Other Potential Costs from the Effects of Climate 
Change on Forests and Range 
Description 
Numerous studies based on climate forecasts as well as impacts already 
occurring indicate that climate change is likely to increase the forest damages 
resulting from disease and pests such as the mountain pine beetle. Mountain 
pine beetle populations are historically held in check by cold winters. As the 
frequency of cold winters decreases, the mountain pine beetle’s exponential 
growth rate goes unfettered and leads to rapid and widespread tree mortality, as 
seen throughout the western United States and Canada.a The mountain pine 
beetle is now beginning to show a potential to jump to non-pine species after 
locally exhausting the supply of pines. Mountain pine beetles could conceivably 
impact the majority of remaining forest in Oregon. Mountain pine beetles can 
interact with other effects that stress forests in Oregon such as increased 
temperatures and decreased soil moisture to hasten tree mortality.b 
Lost forest will lead to lost ecosystem services for Oregonians, such as water 
filtration, water storage and air filtration. The City of Portland avoids purchasing 
a $200 million filtration treatment system for its water supply by protecting 102 
square miles of its watershed. This equates to an avoided cost benefit of $3,000 
per acre for water filtration services.c We do not make an estimate of the total 
value of ecosystem services lost with forest loss because there currently are not 
equivalent identifications of demand for the state as a whole. While the forest 
value from Portland is likely high for most forest in Oregon, it is a value for only 
one ecosystem service, and as the population grows, demand for these services 
will increase as well. 
References and Notes 
a Carroll, A.L., J. Régnière, J.A. Logan et al. 2006. Impacts of Climate Change on Range Expansion by the 
Mountain Pine Beetle. Working Paper No. 2006-14. Canadian Forest Service, Natural Resources 
Canada, Pacific Forestry Centre. Retrieved May 18, 2007, from http://mpb.cfs.nrcan.gc.ca/ 
research/projects/1-02_e.html   
b van Mantgem, P.J., N.L. Stephenson, J.C. Byrne, et al. 2009. “Widespread Increase of Tree 
Mortality Rates in the Western United States.” Science 323: 5913. 
c ECONorthwest, with data from the Portland Water Bureau, http://www.portlandonline.com/ 
water/index.cfm?c=29784; and Krieger, D. 2001. Economic Value of Forest Ecosystem Services: A 
Review. The Wilderness Society. 
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F. Public Health 
1. Increased Low-Altitude Ozone 
Description 
Increased temperatures favor the production of low-altitude ozone, which 
negatively impacts the health of humans that live in urban areas and creates 
costs associated with increased rates of morbidity, premature mortality, and lost 
worker productivity.a  
Assumptions, Data, and Calculation of Mortality  
We apply findings from an assessment of the A2 scenario, which indicate 
elevated ozone levels related to climate change could increase nonaccidental 
mortality by 0.27 percent by 2050.b We linearly interpolate and extrapolate to 
estimate the effect in 2020, 2040, and 2080, then adjust for higher temperatures 
expected in the A1FI scenario. We assume that, absent climate change, 
nonaccidental mortality would rise proportional to future increases in the state’s 
metropolitan population and estimate that the higher ozone concentrations 
would increase annual mortality by 37 in 2020, 77 deaths in 2040, and more than 
180 in 2080.c We estimate the value of the additional premature deaths using 
EPA’s current estimate of the value of a statistical life.d 
To calculate the potential costs of increased morbidity we rely on the results of 
an employee survey, that estimated expenditures associated with conditions, 
such as allergies, asthma, and other respiratory affections, incurred by 
employees, including those who do not suffer from the particular condition.e 
Using these results, we first estimate what the costs would be absent climate 
change by assuming that current costs of hospitalization for conditions related to 
ozone in metropolitan areas will increase proportionate to expected growth in 
Oregon’s labor force. We then apply the results from a study that concluded 
current hospitalization costs related to high ozone concentrations in California 
might triple under the A2 scenario,f and make adjustments to reflect the higher 
temperatures expected under the A1FI scenario. The results represent the 
potential increases in medical costs for 2020, 2040, and 2080.  
To estimate the value of increases in lost productivity as more workers become ill 
from climate-related increases in ozone concentrations, we rely on the findings of 
the same employee surveye and first assume that, absent climate change, current 
levels of lost productivity in metropolitan areas would grow proportional to 
expected growth in Oregon’s labor force. We then apply the results of a study 
that estimated the productivity losses in California related to ozone could 
increase 62 percent under the A2 scenario,f and make adjustments to reflect the 
higher temperatures expected under the A1FI scenario. The results represent the 
potential increases in workers’ lost productivity for 2020, 2040, and 2080. 
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Results  
The calculation of increased morbidity costs does not account for costs that 
would occur outside a hospital (in-patient or emergency room) or for the effects 
of higher ozone concentrations on all sensitive groups, like children and elderly. 
EPA’s value of statistical life represents the value that people, on average, are 
willing to pay to avoid premature mortality from exposure to harm, be it 
pollution, accidents, etc. Researchers have argued that a more appropriate 
measure to value a life is the willingness to accept fatal consequences of exposure 
to harm. This value is usually higher than the willingness to pay.g This means 
that the total value of increased mortality from high ozone concentrations, that 
we estimate above, understate the actual value society places on deaths froom 
climate change. 
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a Ebi, K.L., J. Balbus, P.L. Kinney et al. 2008. “Effects of Global Change on Human Health.” In J.L. 
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December 23, 2008, from http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/07/10/american-life-worth-
less_n_112030.html 
Potential Health-Related Costs from Increased Low-Altitude Ozone 
2020 2040 2080 
Value of Premature Deaths  
$253 million $542 million $1.4 billion 
Value of Increased Morbidity  
$38 million $49 million $72 million 
Value of Lost Productivity   
$397 million $507 million $745 million 
TOTAL   
$688 million $1.1 billion $2.2 billion 
Source: ECONorthwest 
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f Kahrl, F. and D. Roland-Holst. 2008. California Climate Risk and Response. Department of 
Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of California Berkeley. November. Retrieved 
January 7, 2009, from http://are.berkeley.edu/~dwrh/CERES_Web/Docs/California%20Climate 
%20Risk%20and%20Response.pdf. 
g See, for example, Guria, J., J. Leung, M. Jones-Lee, and G. Loomes. 2005. “The Willingness to 
Accept Value of Statistical Life Relative to the Willingness to Pay Value: Evidence and Policy 
Implications.” Environmental and Resource Economics 32: 113-127. 
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2. Increased Heat Waves 
Description 
Additional heat waves (days with temperatures consistently above a threshold 
specific to different geographic areas) are expected to increase mortality rates 
and medical costs of those already suffering from cardiovascular, 
cerebrovascular, and respiratory diseases.a They also will reduce work 
productivity, household productivity, and the value of leisure time. 
Assumptions, Data, and Calculation 
We apply to the entire state the results of a recent study, which estimated 
climate-related heat waves would cause an additional 14 deaths in Portland by 
2055 under the A2 scenario,b and make adjustments to estimate the number of 
additional deaths in 2020, 2040, and 2080 under the A1FI scenario. We estimate 
the value of the additional premature deaths using EPA’s current estimate of the 
value of a statistical life.c 
To calculate additional medical and other costs, we multiplied Oregon’s expected 
future populations times the per capita daily costs for hospitalization, 
emergency-room visits, and follow-up medical costs during the 2006 heat wave 
in California.d We estimate the additional, climate-related costs by applying the 
results of a study that projected Oregon would experience an additional 14 heat-
wave days by 2030 under the A1B scenarioe and making adjustments to estimate 
the number of additional deaths in 2020, 2040, and 2080 under the A1FI scenario.  
Results  
Heat-wave statistics show they cause more deaths than all other natural disasters 
in the US. Death certificates systematically fail to represent high temperatures as 
the death cause during heat waves, however, and a full accounting would 
increase the mortality numbers, perhaps by 54 percent.f 
Potential Value of Health-Related and Other Costs of Heat Waves  
2020 2040 2080 
Value of Premature Deaths  
$66 million $153 million $359 million 
Value of Increased-Medical Care Costs  
$9 million $18 million $51 million 
Value of Other Costs  
$1 million $2 million $5 million 
TOTAL   
$76 million $173 million $415 million 
Source: ECONorthwest 
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EPA’s value of statistical life represents the value that people, on average, are 
willing to pay to avoid premature mortality from exposure to harm, be it 
pollution, accidents, etc. Researchers have argued that a more appropriate 
measure to value a life is the willingness to accept fatal consequences of exposure 
to harm. This value is usually higher than the willingness to pay.g This means 
that the total value of increased mortality from high ozone concentrations, that 
we estimate above, understate the actual value society places on deaths froom 
climate change. 
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3. Other Potential Costs from the Efffects of Climate 
Change on Human Health  
Description 
Impacts of climate change on human health are not restricted to those caused by 
high levels of ozone or heat. Studies have shown that climate change will make 
wider areas hospitable to vectors that produce diseases, such as the West Nile 
virus, encephalitis, and Lyme disease. At the same time, water- and food-borne 
diseases likely will increase in incidence and cases of Giardia, salmonellosis, E. coli 
will become more frequent.a 
We have found no data to quantify these future impacts associated with climate 
change but the lack of quantifiable information does not mean that the value is 
zero.  
References and Notes 
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Research. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Retrieved December 23, 2008, from 
http://www.climatescience.gov/Library/sap/sap4-6/final-report/sap4-6-final-all.pdf. 
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G. Recreation  
1. Reduced Opportunities for Snow-Related Recreation 
Description 
Higher temperatures reduce snowfall and accumulation, shortening the ski 
season, degrading skiing conditions, and reducing revenues for the ski industry.  
Assumptions, Data, and Calculation 
We assume that, absent climate change, downhill skiing participation would 
grow from the 2001-2002 level, 2,279,201 skier-days,a based on population 
growth rates and that the average expenditures and consumer surplus per skier 
day would remain at $70b and $28c per day, respectively. For cross-country 
skiing and snowshoeing, we assume participation would grow from the 2001-
2002 level, 553,446 user-days, a based on population growth and expenditures 
and consumer surplus would remain at $17d per day and $54c per day, 
respectively. We assume that the snow-recreation season will shrink 14 percent 
by 2020 and 30 percent by 2040,e based on a forecast of temperature increases 
associated with business-as-usual emissions. We assume the number of user-
days, expenditures, and consumer surplus shrinks proportionately. We linearly 
extrapolate to estimate the reductions for 2080. The potential harm equals the 
number of user-days times the expenditures and consumer surplus per day times 
the percentage loss of recreation opportunity from climate change.  
Results  
Industry officials suggest that once the snow-recreation season is shortened to 
the extent indicated for 2080, snow-related recreation businesses, and the 
downhill skiing businesses in particular, likely would not be viable and would 
close.f 
References and Notes 
a Oregon Parks and Recreation Department. 2003. 2003-2007 Oregon Statewide Comprehensive 
Outdoor Recreation Plan. January.  
b Berry, M. 2008. Overview of the U.S. Ski Industry. National Ski Areas Association. June 27. 
Potential Value of Reduced Snow-Related Recreation 
2020 2040 2080 
Reduced Value for Downhill Skiing  
$39.5 million $105.5 million $287.6 million 
Reduced Value for Cross-Country Skiing and Snowshoeing 
$6.9 million $18.5 million $50.6 million 
TOTAL   
$46.4 million $124 million $338.2 million 
Source: ECONorthwest 
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2. Reduced Opportunities for Cold-Water Angling  
Description 
Increased stream temperatures reduce the amount of habitat that can viably 
support salmon, reducing the contribution of cold-water angling to the economy.  
Assumptions, Data, and Calculation 
We assume the value of cold-water angling will decline proportionate to 
expected losses of aquatic habitat for salmon and trout. An assessment of the A2 
emissions scenario indicates increased warming might reduce salmon habitat in 
Oregon by 16, 30, and 40 percent by 2030, 2060, and 2090, respectively.a We 
interpolate and adjust the percentages to reflect the A1FI scenario, and apply 
them to 4,861,000,b the number of stream-based angling days in 2006 to estimate 
the reductions in angling in 2020, 2040, and 2080. We adjust for population 
growth in 2020, 2040, and 2080, and value the reductions applying the estimated 
consumer surplus and expenditures per salmon-angler per day: $140c and $67,b 
respectively.  
Results  
These results may overstate the potential harm by applying values associated 
with salmon angling to trout angling. They probably underestimate the total 
harm from climate change, insofar as it also might lead to degraded ocean 
conditions, increased incidence of disease, and other factors that would affect 
future salmon and trout populations.d  
References and Notes 
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c Ransom, M.M. 2001. Economic Impacts of Salmon Fishing. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Natural 
Resources Conservation Service. February 12. 
d Battin, J., M.W. Wiley, M.H. Ruckelshaus, et al. 2007. “Projected Impacts of Climate Change on 
Salmon Habitat Restoration.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of 
America 104 (16): 6720-6725. from http://www.pnas.org/content/104/16/6720.full.pdf+html; 
Independent Scientific Advisory Board. 2007. Climate Change Impacts on Columbia River Basin Fish 
and Wildlife. ISAB Climate Change Report ISAB 2007-2. Pacific Northwest Power and Conservation 
Council. May 11; and Richter, A. and S.A. Kolmes. 2005. “Maximum Temperature Limits for 
Chinook, Coho, and Chum Salmon, and Steelhead Trout in the Pacific Northwest.” Reviews in 
Fisheries Science 13: 23-49. 
Potential Value of Reduced Cold-Water Angling 
2020 2040 2080 
$121 million $266 million $732 million 
Source: ECONorthwest 
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3. Other Potential Costs from the Effects of Climate 
Change on Recreation  
Description 
Increased wildland fires will potentially reduce recreation opportunities during 
summer months. Forest closures during wildland fire events and exceptionally 
dry, high-risk fire seasons may limit the area, and thus opportunities, available 
for activities, such as hiking, mountain biking, wildlife watching, and scenic 
driving. Post-fire landscapes may provide more limited or lower-quality 
recreation experiences.a, b 
Low water levels in streams, especially in late summer, may also reduce some 
water-related recreation opportunities, such as river rafting and kayaking. As 
peak flows shift earlier in the season due to earlier snowmelt, they may not 
longer overlap with the summer season in which many people enjoy river 
recreation. Lower flows during peak summer months may limit boating on 
certain stretches of river and lower the quality of the recreation experience.c 
Though insufficient data are available to quantify these impacts, research 
elsewhere suggests that they have the potential to reduce the value (expenditures 
and consumer surplus) of forest-based and water-related recreation in Oregon. 
References and Notes 
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b Scott, D., G. Wall, and G. McBoyle. 2005. “Chapter 7: Climate Change and Tourism and Recreation 
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IV. THE POTENTIAL ECONOMIC COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH 
ACTIVITIES THAT CONTRIBUTE TO CLIMATE CHANGE 
In this section, we describe costs that are produced by activities associated with 
the business-as-usual pathway that contribute to climate change. Although these 
are not costs resulting directly from the effects of climate change per se, they 
represent important sources of economic harm society incurs by proceeding with 
business-as-usual activities. 
A. Wasteful Use of Energy  
Description 
Consumers incur costs by using technologies and behaviors that are less efficient 
than available substitutes in their use of energy. 
Assumptions, Data, and Calculation 
We assume Oregon’s consumption of electricity and natural gas in 2007a will 
increase at rates estimated by the Energy Information Administrationb for 
Oregon and use percentages reported by several studiesc to estimate the amount 
of energy Oregonians will waste by not implementing cost-effective programs 
and technologies to increase energy efficiency. We estimate the value of the 
expenditures on wasted energy using recent average prices.d 
Results  
References and Notes 
a Energy Information Administration. 2008. Current and Historical Monthly Retail Sales, Revenue and 
Average per Kilowatthour by State and by Sector (Form EIA-826). Retrieved January 15, 2009, from 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/page/sales_revenue.xls; and Energy Information 
Administration. 2008. Oregon Natural Gas Consumption by End Use: 2002-2007. Retrieved January 22, 
2009, from http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/ng/ng_cons_sum_dcu_sor_a. htm. 
b Energy Information Administration. 2008. EERE State Activities and Partnerships: Electric Power and 
Renewable Energy in Oregon. Retrieved January 23, 2009, from http://apps1.eere.energy.gov/ 
states/electricity.cfm/state=OR 
c Nadel, S., A. Shipley, R.N. Elliott. 2004. The Technical, Economic and Achievable Potential for Energy 
Efficiency in the U.S.-A Meta Analysis of Different Studies. American Council for an Energy-Efficient 
Economy. 
d Energy Information Administration. 2008. Current and Historical Monthly Retail Sales, Revenue and 
Average per Kilowatthour by State and by Sector (Form EIA-826). Retrieved January 15, 2009, from 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/page/sales_revenue.xls; and Energy Information 
Administration. 2008. Oregon Natural Gas Prices: 2002-2007. Retrieved from 
http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/ng/ng_pri_sum_dcu_SOR_m.htm 
Potential Value of Wasted Electricity and Natural Gas 
2020 2040 2080 
$1.27 billion $1.47 billion $1.97 billion 
Source: ECONorthwest  
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B. Emissions from the Generation of Coal-Fired 
Electricity  
Description 
Burning coal to generate electricity in Oregon will impose health-related 
spillover costs on Oregonians, i.e., costs not reflected in the price of the 
electricity. 
Assumptions, Data, and Calculation 
The Boardman generating plant, with a generating capacity of 585 megawatts 
(MW), emitted 7,890 metric tons of sulfur dioxide and 5,367 metric tons of 
nitrogen oxide in 2006,a and 239 metric tons of particulate matter less than 10 
microns in diameter in 1999 (the last year for which data are available).b The 
health-related externality costs associated with these pollutants are $2,556 per ton 
for sulfur dioxide, $1,505 per ton for nitrogen oxides, and $3,976 per ton for 
particulate matter.c We assume that, in a business-as-usual future, emissions 
would continue at these rates and that coal-fired electricity generation in Oregon 
would grow at the expected rate for total electricity consumption, 0.8 percent per 
year.d The potential harm is the sum of the cost of the health-related spillover 
costs for the three pollutants. 
Results  
These results likely underestimate the total health-related spillover costs 
associated with coal-fired electricity generation, insofar as they do not include 
other harmful pollutants, such as mercury, volatile organic compounds, and 
carbon monoxide. 
References and Notes 
a Energy Information Administration. 2008. U.S. Electric Power Industry Estimated Emissions (EIA-767 
and EIA 906). Retrieved January 23, 2009, from http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/state/ 
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Externality Costs.” Environmental Science and Technology. 34 (8) 1390-1395. Values converted to 
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Potential Value of Health-Related Spillover Costs of Coal-Fired Electricity 
2020 2040 2080 
$33 million $38 million $52 million 
Source: ECONorthwest 
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V. POTENTIAL ECONOMIC COSTS PER HOUSEHOLD 
The preceding sections illustrate some specific types of potential economic costs 
Oregonians as a whole would face if Oregon, other states, the U.S., and other 
nations adopt a business-as-usual approach to climate change. Here, we scale 
down our findings to illustrate the potential costs per household.  
In 2005, Oregon had 1.42 million households.30 We assume this number will 
grow at the same rates projected for Oregon’s population through 2040 and at 
the rates projected for the U.S. population from 2040 until 2080, reaching 1.71 
million in 2020, 2.11 million in 2040, and 2.79 million in 2080. Dividing these 
numbers into the estimates of statewide potential costs from the preceding 
section for each of these years yields the per-household costs shown in Figure 7. 
These costs are not negligible; based on the median income of a household in 
Oregon in the 2005-2007 period,31 these costs represent 4 percent of household 
earnings in 2020, 5 percent in 2040, and 7 percent in 2080. 
 
 
                                                      
30 U.S. Census Bureau. 2006. “Selected Social Characteristics: Oregon.” 2005 American Community 
Survey. Retrieved January 25, 2009, from http://www.census.gov/acs/www/Area%20Sheets/ 
Area%20Sheet%20OR.doc. 
31 U.S. Census Bureau. No date. “Oregon-Fact Sheet—American FactFinder.” 2005-2007 American 
Community Survey. Retrieved January 26, 2009, from http://factfinder.census.gov/ 
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Figure 7. Potential Economic Costs Per Household in Oregon Under a Business-As-
Usual Approach to Climate Change, 2020, 2040, and 2080 (Dollars per Year) 
Potential Cost 2020 2040 2080 
Costs of Climate Change    
Increased Energy-Related Costs $70 $155 $292 
Reduced Salmon Populations $370 $473 $671 
Increased Flood and Storm Damage  $37 $62 $111 
Reduced Food Production $8 $17 $55 
Increased Wildland Fire Costs $121 $200 $337 
Increased Health-Related Costs  $447 $615 $932 
Lost Recreation Opportunities  $98 $185 $395 
Subtotal for Costs of Climate Change $1,150 $1,707 $2,793 
Additional Costs from Business-as-Usual (BAU) Activities that Contribute to Climate Change 
Inefficient Consumption of Energy $761 $710 $717 
Increased Health Costs from Coal-Fired Emissions $19 $18 $19 
Subtotal for Costs from BAU Activities $780 $728 $736 
Average Cost per Household per Year $1,930 $2,435 $3,529 
Source: ECONorthwest. 
Notes: These numbers illustrate different types of annual cost Oregonians potentially would incur if society were to continue with a 
business-as-usual approach to climate change. There may be overlap between the values for some of the different types of cost. 
Nonetheless, adding the different types of costs probably seriously understates the total potential cost of climate change because 
the table excludes many additional types of climate-related costs that Oregonians would incur under a business-as-usual 
approach. The numbers do not indicate the net effect of climate change, as they do not represent a forecast of how the economy 
will respond to the different effects of climate change, or account for potential economic benefits that might materialize from 
moderate warming and other changes in climate.  
